"THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS OF SPANISH
MEMBERSHIP TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES:
MILESTONES AND LEADING CONSEQUENCES*"
Borja Cortés-Bretón Brinkmann
Diplomat
INCIPE Research Associate
Translated by Dr. Damian R. Sanges d’Abadie
INCIPE Research Associate
“Europe will have to take account of Spain and we
Spaniards are Europeans. It is imperative for both sides
to acknowledge this two-fold reality and for all to assume
the consequences that it entails. It is a necessity of
our times”. With these words, pronounced before
a full session of the Spanish Cortes and before the Council
of the Kingdom on 22 November 1975, on the occasion of
his proclamation as King of Spain, Prince Juan Carlos
sought to underline what would emerge as one of the leading
themes of Spain’s foreign policy at the outset of
the Political Transition that followed General Franco’s
death, namely, Spain’s membership to what were then
known as the European Communities.
Being part of “Europe” was interpreted within
Spain as an unequivocal symbol of compromise for, and
defence of, the fundamental values and democratic principles
inherent in the process of European construction. In this
perspective, it is noteworthy to stress that an earnest
Spanish political interest in getting closer to Europe
had already emerged under the regime of General Franco,
at the beginning of the 1960’s, as a means of legitimizing
Spain’s political system from the outside. Nevertheless,
Spain’s request for membership of the European Communities,
formally presented by Foreign Affairs Minister Fernando
Maria Castiella on 9 February 1962, was firmly rejected
by the so-called “Birkelbach Report”, named
after a Socialist Member of the European Parliament. Spain
did not fulfil the basic prerequisites of a state where
Democracy and the rule of Law prevailed, despite Spain’s
markedly different international standing in the 1960’s
in comparison with that of the 1940’s.
Despite the fact that the letter of application for
Spanish membership to the European Communities had failed
to reach a positive outcome among the other European partners,
Spanish foreign policy henceforth strove to secure a tariff
and trade-oriented commercial agreement with the European
Bloc. These efforts would be successfully rewarded by
the conclusion on 29 June 1970 of a “Spanish-European
Communities Preferential Commercial Agreement” that,
in effect, would underpin Spanish commercial relations
until 1986. By its terms, both parties proclaimed their
mutual desire to work for a gradual abolition of barriers
to trade for the majority of exchanges, in two definite
stages: an initial period, of a duration of at least six
years, and a second phase, that would begin, by common
accord between the parties, once the necessary conditions
were met. In essence, Spain was attempting to reach its
objective of belonging to the “heart of Europe”
through the establishment of a “Preferential Commercial
Agreement”. The European Communities, however, made
quite sure that the final outcome of this process would
only be reached once the prevailing political realities
of Spain allowed it and, therefore, this development would
not take place until General Franco’s death in November
1975.
Throughout this paper, and significantly, with the backdrop
of the likely forthcoming start of the negotiations for
Turkish accession to the European Union, on 3 October
2005, particular emphasis will be placed on three fundamental
aspects of Spain’s own process of accession that,
in substance, highlight the difficult road that Spain
had to undertake in the distant 1970’s, to be able
to integrate itself fully in the European Union. At the
outset, greatest emphasis will be placed on the negotiation
and accession process itself. Why was the political rapprochement
of Spain to the European Communities so complex and what
were the most conflictive issues? Secondly, particular
consideration will be placed upon one of the main dimensions
on which Spain had to devote its greatest efforts –
the radical overhaul of its economic and industrial base.
From this standpoint, it will also be of particular interest
to reflect on how far Spain’s economy and society
have evolved since then, precisely due to these reforms.
And, lastly, some consideration will be given to the image
of Spain within the European Union. Despite the fact that,
initially, our external image was in the main quite negative
- no one could get used to the reality of entering into
a dialogue with a country like Spain, that a newspaper
in Rotterdam had described as “a strange bird that
knocked at the Community’s doors” - Spanish
diplomacy succeeded in transforming this early appreciation
through practical contributions, that were without doubt
of substantial relevance for the evolution of the future
European Union.
1. The Process of Accession of Spain to the European Communities:
Main Difficulties
The primary goal of the Transition Governments was to
overcome the external legacy bequeathed by the Franco
regime. While there had, undeniably, been a substantial
evolution in Spain’s place in the international
community from the immediate aftermath of the Second World
War - in 1955 Spain had joined the United Nations and
had fully embraced and subscribed to the main underlying
principles and guidelines that governed the leading international
institutions as the OECD, the IMF, the World Bank or even
the GATT Negotiating Rounds - the authoritarian nature
of the regime continued to devalue Spain’s prospects
on the international stage and, thereby, ensured its continued
isolation.
Moreover, beyond this unfavourable context for Spain’s
image in the world, additional difficulties would arise
with the gradual demise of the regime of General Franco.
The “Burgos Trial”; the case “Puig Antich”;
the case of “Bishop Añoveros” or the
capital punishments by firing squads of September 1975,
all caused great reverberations and unease across Europe.
A Spain that sought to get near to “the heart of
Europe” by promoting its economic and commercial
attributes and by striving to conform to its principles
and values would quickly find itself marginalised, and
as an outcast, as a result of these developments. Relations
with Europe effectively reached a nadir and this also
included a break-up of the dialogue undertaken to ensure
a greater equilibrium to the 1970 “Preferential
Commercial Agreement”.
Thus the initial steps undertaken towards a progressive
“normalisation” of foreign relations did not
result in a rapprochement of Spain with the European Communities.
It is possible to point out a series of milestones, prior
to the beginning of negotiations with the European Communities
around September 1979, that reflect the progressive normalisation
of Spain’s political regime with the outside world
during the Transition. The signing of a new Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation in January 1976 with the US
Administration would enable the beginning of a gradual
process of normalisation of relations with the United
States. The renovation of relations between Church and
State, resulting from the accord signed between Spain
and the Vatican in Rome in July 1976, would lay the groundwork
for the subsequent Concordat of January 1979 that would
enable a dialogue between Church and State fully compatible
with the values of the recently-approved democratic Constitution.
The ratification of several international instruments
of primary importance revealed Spain’s incipient
compromise with democratic values (notably the ratification
of International Agreements governing Civil and Political
Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in April
1977 and the signing in November 1977 of the European
Convention on Human rights). Finally, other instances
that highlighted the progressive external normalisation
of Spain’s political system were provided by the
increasingly universal character of Spain’s diplomatic
relations, establishing links with countries that had
previously refused to recognize Franco’s Spain,
fundamentally due to the political nature of its regime
with its authoritarian character. In this light, relations
were normalised with Mexico, Rumania, Bulgaria, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique and several
other countries, but significantly Spain did not reach
full diplomatic relations with the state of Israel until
1986, precisely within the ambit of Spain’s accession
to the European Communities.
As far as the process of Spanish accession to the European
Communities is concerned, the official request for membership
was formally presented by Spain’s Foreign Minister
Marcelino Oreja on 28 July 1977. This second request for
entry was framed within a different historic context from
that which had prevailed in 1962. Spain had approved the
Statute for Political Reform, which provided a clear break
in terms of prevailing values and principles with those
of the old regime. In April 1977 the Communist Party was
legalised. The cumulative effect of these developments,
together with the call for democratically-based general
elections - finally held on 15 June 1977 - was that the
European Parliament, as the expression and the embodiment
of the democratic conscience of the European Communities,
formally acknowledged that the Suarez Government was fulfilling
its democratic engagements, thereby lifting the political
veto imposed by the previously mentioned “Birkelbach
Report” in 1962. Nevertheless, practical negotiations
with Brussels would not begin until September 1979 - following
a Council opinion, on 19 December 1978, coming out in
favour of Spain’s request for membership and in
the aftermath of a Report from the Commission, establishing
that accession negotiations with Spain should formally
begin in February 1979 - revealing the degree of reluctance
and the hurdles Spain had to face in its attempt to get
closer to “Europe”.
The Spanish request for membership was greeted with a
mixture of cheerfulness and apprehension on the part of
the Member States of the European Communities. As for
the applications of Greece and Portugal, Spain’s
accession application reflected the advance of Democracy
in Europe and marked an acknowledgement of the prestige
that the European Communities enjoyed in the international
community. However, unlike the other two applications,
the Spanish approach raised serious questions given the
character and size of its economy. In Brussels and in
some European capitals, and especially in Paris, a notable
degree of anxiety was generated by Spain’s agricultural
sector; by the size of its fishing fleet and the need
to restructure it in order to contend with the growing
competitiveness of Asian fleets; by the issue of the mobility
of the labour force; or by the relative under-developed
character of some of Spain’s regions.
However, the underlying cause for the protracted and
difficult character of Spanish negotiations was, moreover,
the complex and unique period Europe was going through.
The two oil crises of the 1970’s together with the
lack of internal reforms of the Community institutions
had led to a sort of structural paralysis - widely described
at the time as “eurosclerosis” - that affected
the European construction process. In this environment,
the goals and rightful claims expounded by Spanish diplomacy
had to contend with an adverse historic context, beyond
the clear reticence expressed by some specific member
states.
Two statements, made around the month of February 1979,
are indicative of the extent of the difficulty Spain would
encounter in the negotiating process it was about to embark
on. On the one hand was the statement made by the European
Commission President, Roy Jenkins, to journalists at the
close of the inaugural negotiating session: “the
road undertaken today by Spain may be compared to the
heroic deeds performed by this great country five hundred
years ago”. This was undoubtedly an over-statement
with romantic tones, harking back to Spain’s past,
but it nevertheless revealed the perception of Spain that
prevailed in the Community Institutions and the difficult
road Spain still had to cover, if it wanted to join the
European Communities. On the other hand, an equally clear
image of the true state of events and where the main obstacles
lay for Spain, at the outset of its negotiations, were
revealed by the pronouncements to the newspaper Le Figaro
by Council President and French Foreign Trade Minister
Jean Francois Poncet, at the close of that same inaugural
session: “The enlargement, especially with the entry
of Spain, raises risks, notably in the area of Mediterranean
agricultural products and wines […].
As far as the negotiating process itself is concerned,
the endeavour would last a little over six years. Given
that the ultimate objective of these negotiations would
be the integration of Spain in the European Communities,
the unfolding of the talks was underscored by two distinct
parameters: one with an immutable character and the other
changing, according to the outcome of ongoing deliberations
among the Member States. The fixed parameter referred
to the compulsory requirement for all candidates to subscribe
fully to the so-called “Acquis Communautaire”,
that is the complete body of rules and legislation governing
the European Communities. The variable consideration of
the negotiations referred to the periods of transition
that were envisaged for respective candidate states in
which to undertake their integration, so that during these
times they could gradually assume the Community legislation
into their national legislative and judicial frameworks.
Currently, these arrangements are commonly known as the
“Copenhagen Criteria”, following their formalisation
on the occasion of the European Council of 1993, as these
set out, for the future, the parameters to evaluate whether
a candidate-state might or might not join the European
Union.
The Spanish negotiating process would enjoy a decisive
push under the German European Presidency, specifically
during the Stuttgart European Council of June 1983. Spain’s
position vis-à-vis the defence of the West - the
entry of Spain in NATO in May 1982, under the Presidency
of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo - would reassure German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl. The strong backing of the Chancellor would
be translated in an extension of the necessary transition
periods, so that the accession would not impact adversely
on the stability of our economic system and so that, equally,
the European Communities were able to deal without problem
to the inevitable changes caused by the enlargement. Moreover,
other issues were also satisfactorily resolved, like how
to link the growth of national resources to the culmination
of the internal reforms of the European Communities. All
these issues would find their conclusive expression in
the “Single European Act”.
Negotiations for Spain finally reached a positive outcome
at the negotiating conference held on 28 and 29 March
1985. The Treaty of Membership of Spain to the European
Communities was signed in Madrid on 12 June 1985, coming
into force on 1 January 1986. Although Spain found herself
in total isolation at the outset of the post-war, it had
succeeded in forming part of the Community design; a goal
that, effectively, was always uppermost on Spain’s
foreign policy agenda.
2. Leading Economic Reforms: Consequences for Spain of
its European Communities Membership
In spite of the diplomatic success that the “Preferential
Commercial Agreement” with the European Communities”
of June 1970 had meant for Spain - the accord was asymmetrical
in favour of Spain - and of the sustained economic growth
the country enjoyed, with a yearly average of nearly 8%
until the first oil crisis of 1973, the country’s
economic growth was significantly failing to be translated
into a nationwide economic development, and moreover,
the structural weaknesses that hampered Spain’s
overall progress showed no sign of disappearing.
As Fuentes Quintana and Jaime Requeijo clearly stressed,
Spain’s economic and industrial base suffered from
four main weaknesses at the beginning of the 1970’s.
In the first place, stood the weakness of the agrarian
sector. The uneven paces of growth of the agricultural
and industrial sectors would lead to important rigidities
in the overall economic dynamics. The increasing labour
force migration towards the industrial and service sectors
was raising the salaries in agriculture, leading to the
emergence of a system similar to that which prevailed
in the European Communities. The consequence of these
developments was a surplus of unwanted agricultural produce
and a deficit in those most in demand.
Secondly was the serious economic difficulties experienced
by the country’s economic activities, resulting
from its heavy energy dependence that prevented their
smooth performance and, thirdly, and closely related with
this reality, stood the country’s weak industrial
development. Spain had an excessive external dependence
on imported energy. Thus while in 1961 demand for oil
was around 28.8%, in 1974 it stood around 67.8%. This
meant an increase in demand of nearly 170%. On the other
hand, industrial development rested upon companies with
weak financial structures - subject to bank loans and
the vagaries of the financial markets - with a sizeable
energy consumption and a high technological dependence.
Finally, the fourth weakness that adversely affected Spain’s
economic outlook and compromised its chances of a better
future was the performance of our external sector. The
combined result of Spain’s economic activities ensured
a persistent trade deficit in our Balance of Payments.
Once the political Transition had been set on its course,
in the aftermath of the first democratic general elections
in mid-1977, the Government began to address the various
deficiencies besetting the economy. One of the first measures
that were taken was to devalue the peseta, with a view
to improve the state of the Balance of Trade. However,
it soon emerged that the reforms would require a wide-ranging
consensus from all political actors and social forces
of the time. This would lead to the signature of the so-called
“Moncloa Accords” of October 1977, where an
earnest appeal was made to the conscience and responsibility
of all political and social groups, that they each assumed
their share of the sacrifice in their respective activities
that this national approach entailed.
The “Moncloa Accords” envisaged the introduction
of two types of measures. On the one hand, there were
policies designed to restore the health of the economy
with the fight against spiralling inflationary pressures
- through a monetary policy that sought to control disposable
liquidity and a reduction in public expenditure - and
the search for an equilibrium in the Balance of Payments,
including with measures that set the exchange rate of
the peseta to a more realistic level. On the other hand,
it is important to note the considerable reforms that
were intended for several distinct areas of public finances,
as the reform of the fiscal system, in order to bring
the old-fashioned system nearer to the European one, and
to give a preferential backing to three main taxes, namely
income tax, corporation tax and value-added tax; the reform
of the financial system; the reform of the budget so as
to better bring under control public expenditure; a new
industrial relations framework to improve the activities
of public industries, with a system to better monitor
their performance and to assess their results; or the
definition of a new framework of labour relations, through
the elaboration of a “Workers’ Statute”.
The results of these measures were unprecedented. They
allowed bringing to a halt the inflationary spiral, made
worse by the oil crises of the 1970’s, and at the
same time also ensured that the Balance of Payments swung
into equilibrium. On the other hand, Spain would also
attain a moderate improvement of its productive capacity
arising from the previously-mentioned fiscal, financial
and labour reforms. Nevertheless the very success of these
measures ensured that the consensus that had earlier prevailed
between all the political and social forces, and that
had been instrumental in the signing of the “Moncloa
Accords”, came to an end by the close of the 1970’s.
This development, adding itself to the growing cracks
and divisions appearing in the cohesion of the party in
Government, and the second oil crisis would once again
highlight the structural difficulties that had existed
and had dragged the Spanish economy down even before Transition.
The electoral victory and coming to power of the Socialist
Party - or as it is known under its official name as the
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) in November
1982, enjoying of an absolute Parliamentary majority,
enabled the launch of a new political programme stressing
an unequivocal and earnest economic readjustment based
on the pursuit of a two-fold strategy: the attainment
of sustained economic growth and the modernisation of
the Spanish economy, to prepare it for its integration
in the European Communities. Included as part of this
strategy were uncompromising measures that would bring
about a rationalisation of industry and that were still
pending from the earlier stage of the “Moncloa Pact”.
Additionally, other measures were aimed towards the areas
of agriculture and fisheries; to ensuring a greater flexibility
in the labour market; towards a rationalisation of the
Social Security system, etc.
In spite of the hardships and social discontent that
these wide-raging series of measures, by successive governments,
have occasionally generated, the fact that they have had
a positive outcome cannot be refuted. The reforms undertaken
both by the PSOE and the Popular Party (PP) governments,
broadly taking on board Brussels-led directives, have
radically transformed the economic and social reality
of Spain. In effect, while in 1986, the year of its accession
to the Community, Spain’s economic performance and
level of development meant that its national income barely
reached 68% of the Community’s income; Spanish national
income currently stands at over 87% of the Community’s
average. Spain’s progressive narrowing of the gap
in terms of economic growth and social wellbeing vis-à-vis
the other European partners has not merely been a theoretical
one, but has manifested itself in several practical ways.
The greater rights enjoyed by women and their growing
equality with men; rising opportunities for the young;
the ongoing efforts undertaken in the ambit of the Environment
or even the progressive cohesion among the various regions
that make up our State, provide some examples of the wide-ranging
changes that have been occurring in the daily lives of
the people of Spain as a consequence of our belonging
to the “European project”.
It may be possible to distinguish four distinct dimensions
that highlight the impact integration in the Community’s
dynamics has had onto our economic and social evolution.
In the first place, one cannot fail to emphasize the phenomenal
opening of our economy to the outside world. Spain is
currently one of the world’s most open economies
- with around 70% of its gross domestic product depending
on external activities - and has emerged as the sixth
largest investor in the world. Moreover, the European
Union nowadays represents our leading commercial partner;
around 60% to 70% of our overall exports and imports are
directed towards the European Union.
In second place, there is no doubt that agriculture
as a sector has been profoundly influenced by our belonging
to the European Union. Nevertheless, beyond the painful
adjustments that have been caused by the EU-led reforms
in this area, it is important to stress the specialisation
in productive capacities that has steadily taken place
within the sector, as well as the rise in per capita income
enjoyed by those employed in it, arising from Community’s
instruments as the European Agriculture Guarantee Fund
(FEOGA-Garantía). At present, agriculture contributes
around 3.5% of our GDP and employs approximately 7.5%
of our active labour force.
Spain’s industries and financial sectors have
been equally affected by our membership. Successive privatisations
of various state-owned companies; mergers and acquisitions
and the advances in information technology have enabled
Spanish and European companies to become competitive and
to share in the benefits of an increasingly global economy.
Finally, it is important to point out one of the sectors
that mainly reflects the fundamental changes that have
taken place at the heart of our economy. The tertiary
sector has been directly affected by European policies
emphasising deregulation and liberalisation. Their impact
has been the emergence of wider opportunities for choice
for the consumer and lower rates, for example in the areas
of energy and telecommunications. The service sector has
become one of the main driving engines of developed economies,
and for Spain it represents around 65% of our GDP and
nearly 60% in terms of national employment.
3. The Image of Spain in the European Union: Main Contributions
of Spain to the European Construction Process
Spain’s initial efforts to get politically closer
to the European Communities were perceived at the outset,
as was previously said, reiterating the words of a Rotterdam
daily, as the approach of “a strange bird that knocked
at the Community’s doors”. Spain not only
had to manifest that it was able and willing to respect
the fundamental values and principles underpinning Western
democracies - yet, at times, some outcomes as the failed
military coup of 23 February, raised into question the
earnestness of Spanish political leaders - but it also
had to undertake substantial efforts to radically overhaul
its economy and society. This reality, to get it straight,
was instrumental in determining Spain’s initial
outlook within the European Union.
However, at a time when we are about to celebrate the
twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of
Membership of Spain to the European Communities, the image
Spain projects at the heart of the European Union is radically
different. Spain has transformed itself into a faithful
partner and gone from playing only a passive role in the
European construction process to an unequivocally leading
role, sponsoring initiatives that, to a large extent,
are going to shape the future of the “European project”.
Spain is fully aware that by defending the interests of
“Europe” on the international stage, it is
also, at the same time, favouring Spain’s very own
interests.
In this perspective, one of the leading contributions
of Spain has been the introduction and gradual consolidation
of the notion of a “Citizens’ Europe”.
The concept of a “European Citizenship” presents
a momentous significance for the present and future dynamics
of the Union, and it was soon acknowledged that a failure
to properly take this dimension into account, and not
ensuring a meaningful involvement and participation of
Europe’s citizens in the “European Project”,
would entail that “Euroscepticism” and the
“democratic deficit” would inevitably gain
ground. “European Citizenship”, effectively,
was fully enshrined by the Treaty of Maastricht, possessing
a practical and direct aspect for the Union.
“European Citizenship”, however, has found
acceptance within a wider context with the emergence of
a true space of “Liberty, Security and Justice”
and that reality, in the process, has confirmed the positive
and constructive character of Spanish diplomacy. Additionally,
the gradual coming into being of a Community-wide asylum
and immigration policy; cooperation in the ambit of justice
and legal affairs; the collective fight against crime,
or the essential cooperation on the issue of terrorism
have all increasingly come to be addressed collectively
under the aegis of the emerging area of “Liberty,
Security and Justice” of the European Union. Spanish
diplomacy has emerged as one of the most active defenders
of the criteria set down at the Tampere (Finland) European
Council in October 1999, arguing, at the present time,
for the effective implementation of the guidelines framed
within the so-called “Programme of The Hague”.
The notion of “European Citizenship” and
the creation of a genuine area of “Liberty, Security
and Justice” cannot be devoid of a social and welfare
dimension that has to lie at the very core of the process
of European construction. In this context, Spain has unequivocally
staked its position whereby, beyond the emergence of an
“Economic and Monetary Europe”, whose current
over-arching symbol is the Euro, it has advocated the
emergence of a Europe based on sustainable growth and
one that is in full harmony with both its social and environmental
aspects. The so-called “Lisbon Strategy”,
launched by the European Council of March 2000, stands
as of the major contributions of Spanish diplomacy in
the socio-economic area. Exactly five years on from its
inception, Spain, in conjunction with its European partners,
aims to breathe new life into this “Strategy”
with the intention of transforming the Union, by 2010,
into one of the most prosperous and competitive areas
of the globe, with even higher levels of wellbeing and
an unequivocal respect for the Environment.
Nevertheless, Spain has not merely been a successful
promoter and leader of initiatives at the heart of the
European Union, but it has managed to involve the Union
beyond its external frontiers in areas that historically
possessed an interest for our country. The institutionalisation
of a European political, economic and socio-cultural dialogue
with the Mediterranean-rim countries and with Latin America
provides a clear example of this strategy. The so-called
“Barcelona Process”, begun in November 1995
under the Spanish EU Presidency, stands as one of the
milestones of our contribution to the external dynamics
of the Union. It is not only in Spain’s interest,
but of the “European Project” in its collective
dimension, to ensure the greater development and political
stability of regions as strategically significant as North
Africa and the Middle East. This reality therefore underscores
the momentous significance possessed by the re-launch
of the “Barcelona Process” in the second semester
of this year, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary
of its inception.
Equally important, furthermore, is Spain’s special
relations network with Latin America. Spain has not limited
itself to acting as a “bridge” between “Europe”
and “America”, but it has also actively contributed
to the implementation of a European policy of cooperation
and development and to the establishment of Free Trade
Agreements with Mexico and Chile. The creation of a Free
Trade Area linking the European Union and MERCOSUR, together
with the launch of negotiations with the Andean and Central
American Communities, with a similar objective, currently
stand as some of the outstanding topics on the foreign
policy agenda of the European Union.
4. Conclusions
The Spain that readied itself to knock at the European
Communities door, in the now distant past of the mid-1970’s,
is an altogether different world from the contemporary,
democratic and modern country that Spain is nowadays.
Spain has undergone a transformation from a three-fold
perspective: political, economic and social. It has ceased
to display a passive outlook in the European construction
process and has assumed, through its initiatives, an active
role in the evolution of the Union. One of the last milestones,
in no uncertain terms, is having been the first Member
State of the Union to express itself, through a nationwide
referendum that supported the Treaty on the European Constitution,
in favour of the “Europe of Tomorrow”.
Nevertheless, in what ways can lessons possibly be drawn
from the political and economic rapprochement to “Europe”
achieved by Spain in the light of the negotiating process
that Turkey is likely to embark on from the forthcoming
3 October? There is no doubt that we find ourselves before
two quite distinct countries. The European Communities
of the 1970’s, moreover, cannot possibly be compared
to the present-day European Union. And even the international
society of the 1970’s and 1980’s was radically
different from that with which we are confronted and have
to contend with in our everyday lives.
Yet, it may be true to state that Turkey too is considered
today as a “strange bird at the doors of the Community”.
However, provided that Turkey engages itself to faithfully
meet the “Copenhagen Criteria” and to subscribe
fully to the “Acquis Communautaire”, the country
has the capacity to contribute significantly to the future
development of the European Union. The sizeable energy
reserves that are enclosed within its area or the special
network of relations it maintains with Asia represent
only some of the positive assets it could bring forth
to the “European Project”.
