Presentation given by
Mr. Dietrich Austermann
Member of the German Bundestag
at INCIPE

Madrid, June 4, 2004

The attacks in Madrid brought home to us in a most painful way the realisation that terror has reached Europe. I would like to use this opportunity, here in Madrid, to express my personal sympathy for the victims of this insidious terrorist attack and their relatives. This attack shocked the whole of Europe.

In Germany too, the population has to be prepared for the new threats we face. The security authorities responsible need to be equipped to cope with the fact that our country could become the target of comparable terrorist attacks at any time.

This is why a responsible security policy is indispensable in order to fully protect people from these new dangers and risks. If this is to be done, efficient security structures need to be maintained and – ifonecessary – built up from scratch.

For years, I have been a rapporteuron the defence budget for the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag. As such, I am interested in approaches that could be used to build up appropriate security structures – for one very pragmatic reason: Sooner or later, we will have to provide the Bundeswehr – as a fundamental instrument of German security policy – with the resources it needs to respond to these new demands.

On 21 May 2003, the Federal Minister of Defence presented Germany’s new Defence Policy Guidelines in Berlin. With this step, far-reaching decisions were being made that will inevitably result in the implementation of structural measures. Unfortunately, the issue of modern domestic security was neglected in the Guidelines due to lack of resources. The Bundeswehr is being organised as an army for deployment abroad.

This is allowing a dangerous strategic security gap to open up. Domestic security is anchored as a central principle in our Basic Law, as is compulsory military service. However, the basic belief in these principles is no longer shared by all the parties represented in parliament. Their ideas about the future are correspondingly diverse.

Above all, the Social Democrats see the Bundeswehr’s key task in future as providing special high-tech intervention forces. This one-sided concern with deployments outside Germany also accords with the attitude adopted by their Green coalition partners, who want to abolish compulsory military service and restrict the German armed forces to participation in intervention missions in a Unitedonations framework.

The Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union see an urgent need for action and are therefore calling for an overall security policy concept to be drawn up as soon as possible. They argue that no action should be taken that would change existing structures or open up security gaps until this has been done.

Against this background, it is particularly important that consideration be given to the budgetary situation.

Unfortunately, Germany’s dramatic financial situation is reflected above all in the spending on our armed forces. To raise funds for the process of modernising our Army, the minister ordered it to be reduced in size. Followingonumerous cutbacks, the budget for the Bundeswehr in 2004 is only 23.7 billion Euros.

There were plans to create greater scope for modernisation and procurement by reducing the number of soldiers to 252,000 and cutting the civilian workforce. After the additional cutbacks to the budget, this room for manoeuvre has now gone.

However, if we want a Bundeswehr with a new structure that is equal to the unprecedented demands being placed on it and gives it the intervention capability necessary to meet our increased international responsibilities, we must also supply it with the resources to ensure that our soldiers are protected on international missions.
Unfortunately, there has been a failure to do this.

Protected vehicles, such as the Dingo 2, the Multi A3 and the Duro, the basic equipment for the “infantryman of the future”, are all being delayed until between 2007 and 2009.

The Bundeswehr does not have the best German and European industry has to offer.onor will it get the best in the foreseeable future. The budget for the Bundeswehr is being squeezed by major procurement projects. Including the Eurofighter. The minister wants to obtain a blank cheque for the second tranche of this project from the Budget Committee of the Bundestag before the summer recess without even showing the Committee’s members the contracts. Also the contracts with the Spanish partner.

Our Air Force took delivery of the first series production Eurofighter aircraft in April. But so far they have only been able to fly in good weather. Against this background, it should be understandable that the members of the Budget Committee evince a certain scepticism. After all, the Bundeswehr wants to conclude contracts worth 4.6 billion Euros with our cooperation partners, Great Britain, Italy and Spain.

Another question is whether it is sensible for the Air Force to continue as the main focus of investment. For, as Ionoted at the beginning of my comments today, in the thinking of the German Federal Minister of Defence it is the Army that will bear the main burden of future missions.

However, I would like to express some doubt about the basic approach of creating an “intervention army”. The real threat to the world and the liberal democracies comes from international terrorism.

The missions undertaken by our soldiers in many parts of the globe are one element in our response to this threat, the other element, made up of intelligent defence and steps to track down those secretly planning attacks, is regrettably still underdeveloped.

I would identify clear failureson the part of the Federal Ministry of Defence in the fields of biosensory systems and measures to combat attacks on German territory. Unfortunately, the funding for research and development in the defence budget is at the same level as in 1984. In comparison to it the Spanish situation.

At this point, it has to be asked whether everything really is being done to exploit the economic potential available. By this, however, I do not mean hiring expensive consultants for millions of euros, money that is urgently needed elsewhere.

Another poor example of the efforts being made in the field of privatisation is the pointless expenditure of tens of millions of euros on the Development, Procurement and Management Group (GEBB).onothing has yet been seen of the savings the (Development, Procurement and Management Group) was once forecast to make, amounting to 600 million euros.

Only in the area of what is known as fleet management is it likely to generate millions, though not tens of millions, of euros. There are also problems with the private-public partnership project (PPP) developing theH 90 simulator and the Herkules programme. The privatisation of the Special Air Mission Group is not making any progress either.

These examples indicate that the partnership between the business community and the Bundeswehr announced in 1999 is not yet functioning in Germany. These arrangements have not solved any budgetary problems. Instead, extra costs have been incurred.

Thus, the deficits in the fields of command and control capabilities, intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, mobility, operational effectiveness, support services and sustainability, survivability, transport capacities and protective technology will continue to exist. We need to adjust our approach to warfare in order to address asymmetric threats. These deficits must be dealt with urgently.

Our ability to safeguard our national security interests is being affected by our financial situation, in other words, the economic and fiscal policy incompetence of the Social Democrat-Green Federal Government in Berlin. If you’ll wait some years in Spain, then you will have the same situation as in Germany.

In consequence, the next reform to eliminate the deficits described above will be necessary after the German federal elections in 2006 at the latest. The structure and equipment of the Bundeswehr will have to be adapted in the context of an independent foreign policy. The Bundeswehr is the instrument for the defence of Germany’s full range of national security interests, interests that, to date, have not been clearly defined by the current Federal Government.

Let me now goon to examine the situation in Europe.

The new nato, with its seven new European members, is still seeking answers to the challenges of the 21st century. Many questions are being raised:

How are Nato and the EU reacting to terrorism, which has taken on entirely one, almost apocalyptic dimensions?

The threat situation has changed dramatically. Nato, which once focused exclusively on defence, must combat new dangers where they arise.

Has Nato reformed its own structures?

After 1990, defence budgets were cut in all Nato countries except Spain. Do we still need conventional land forces, thousands of tanks and heavy weapons? Are thereono more potential attackers? Are we now surrounded only by friends? Or is there perhaps a new threaton our doorstep?

In my view, the new security risks are located in the Middle East, but they can also – through terrorism – potentially affect any country. Nato has rightly stated that we need forces with modern equipment which are fast, mobile, and capable of intervening. In Prague, member states adopted the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), which is intended to reduce the gap between the EU and the USA. Capabilities in the areas of air transportation, air-to-air refuelling and strategic intelligence must be built up. A modern command and communications structure must be established. Measures must be taken to deter biological and chemical attacks.

EU states should make every effort to avoid duplicating structures and expenditure. The European defence initiative reached a turning pointon 11 March 2003. A new defence agency is to be set up to improve competitiveness and joint technical foundations, a prerequisite for a joint European security strategy. While US defence expenditure amounts to 400 billion euros, Europe spends only 160 billion euros. There are too many defence companies in Europe, which contrasts with the few large businesses in the United States. In Europe we have four tank development projects, thirty firms which manufacture ammunition, and shipbuilding is carried out entirely a national level. There is stillono European market in defence equipment, no common norms and standards. Divergent rules govern exports. Too little funding is made available for research. Germany spends lesson research relating to defence equipment today than it did in 1984!

The decision taken in Thessaloniki to establish a joint agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments is a fresh step towards strengthening joint defence efforts, following some which were not entirely successful. In order to restructure European defence policy, this step is vital, even if its success is not yet guaranteed.

The European Commissioner for Enterprise and Information Society, Erkki Liikanen, expects a European market for defence equipment to develop. However, the question is whether the cake to be divided up between the states involved will grow larger simply because more markets are available. Could the partner countries afford to spend more on defence orders? Germany could certainly not at the moment. As regards Spain, outsiders are still not entirely sure where the country is heading following the change of government. A great deal depends above allon the new structure of security policy in Europe and readiness to put aside national egoism in the interests of a shared aim and enhanced effectiveness.

There are various forms of successful cooperation in Europe, both bilateral and multilateral. The most obvious examples of this are the Eurofighter, the future transport aircraft (FTA) and various helicopters. Germany and Spain are linked by three bilateral armaments bodies. The procurement stage has been reached in one area of cooperation (folding bridge), while the Nato Frigate Replacement (NFR) was halted. Decisions have yet to be taken on arming the Tiger, the Eurofighter, and on the number of units in the context of the agreed projects. It is time for us to cooperate well with the new Spanish government and take decisions swiftly on these issues.

The scepticism which has resulted from various joint European projects in recent years, particularly between France and Germany, is due to the efforts of all states to secure as much work as possible for as many of their own country’s employees as possible. Work-share agreements are often not complied with in practice. The joint European agency will not be able to completely eliminate diverge national interests either. However, it should be given a chance, in order to achieve a successful defence and procurement policy with its sights fixed firmly on the new threats.