UNITED STATES AND THE WAR AGAINST
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Damian R. Sanges d’Abadie
Investigador Asociado del INCIPE

Research Associate, Centre for Defence Studies,

King’s College London

Washington's readiness to challenge any eventuality that may develop into a threat for the US or its immediate security interests has not been welcomed around the world, including by the vast majority of its allies. It has generated a substantial degree of international outcry and resurrected an old principle as the rationale of contemporary US foreign and security policy.

At the close of the Second World War - and in a far more earnest manner than after the First - from Yalta onwards, one political principle pre-eminently governed all the victorious powers' actions and the subsequent post-war international settlement in Europe, as well as in Asia: Never Again. It was intended to avoid the failures, international divisions and indecisions of the past.Never again would Germany be able to threaten its neighbours' territorial integrity and the stability of the Continent.

Never again would the territorial ambitions of aggrandisement of either Germany or Japan be a cause for worldwide upheavals. Never again would their societies be fertile grounds for political grievances that could provide the springboard for opportunistic military adventurism. And above all, never again would the international community permit that a society could decide the fate of the peoples within its boundaries, their life or death, or uphold a divisive or racist ideology, without acting in their defence or taking steps to ensure that basic universal human rights and dignity were safeguarded. This precautionary principle soon led to the emergence of various organisations intended to foster harmonious international relations but also mutual security and defence arrangements, whose commón visión was to address and prevent crises before they arose.

The bellicose tone of the United States towards the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq since early 2002, combining an ever-greater military readiness to its verbal denunciations, highlights an unequivocal application of this strategy by the United States with a determinatión to act before adverse consequences may arise for US security and long-term stability from states or groups around the world. Never again is America willing to find itself unaware and at the mercy of states or groups ón the international stage, victim of a terrorist outrage of similar magnitude to that of 11 September 2001.

The United States is now determined to act in anticipatión of events and before developments gain a clearly unfavourable momentum. September 11 was not only the single largest international act of terror in History but it exposed the total unpreparedness of the international community, including of the United States, in dealing with the new threats and challenges, that had been foreseen and outlined at a theoretical level in many analyses ever
since the Berlin Wall had ceased to represent the layout of the Europe of Yalta. September 11 was a wake up call for the US equalled only by the infamy of Pearl Harbour. It has aroused in the US, more than the need for swift punishment of those guilty of the act with harsh military revenge, a deep sentiment of shock and of potential vulnerability that can only be addressed with the deployment of an altogether new national security strategy, where the armed forces on a perpetual state of readiness, represent a key element in this strategy.

The subsequent realisatión that al-Qaeda's terrorists had been able to exploit gaps in US intelligence, together with the freedom provided by US society before the outrage, has made Washingtón even more determined to act ón the suspición of ill-intentión rather than wait for material evidence to emerge. Washingtón is at present keen to prevent unwanted developments, as the sale of dangerous substances or weapons of mass destructión by states harbouring negative intentions towards the US and with possible links to terrorist networks, rather that just concentrating ón unprincipled or radical leaders espousing anti-American ideologies. Washington's strategy is based ón the belief that in the new world order where international anarchy is even more acute, national security cannot be governed by principles that were valid while bipolarity prevailed, including deterrence, or be held back by them.

As President Bush declared in March 2002, in the wake of the downfall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and in light of the US ongoing war against terrorism, when it comes to dealing with irrational elements, weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, these "do not allow for a margin of error". Democracies "cannot learn from their mistakes" and above all "doing nothing is not an option". There are no motives of power in the US strategy despite the worldwide perceptión that it has raised; only National Self-Interest. National self-interest represents the dynamics of the Bush Doctrine, based ón the unrivalled US military pre-eminence, to ensure that national stability and security prevail and to prevent adverse consequences for the United States. In this perspective, therefore, lies the United States determinatión to ensure that Baghdad clearly complies with the United Nations' dictates for disarmament over weapons of mass destruction, given the danger it might pose for the US. For Washington, Iraq may only represent the first actor to be targeted by this strategy and to find itself in the direct line of US firepower.

Nevertheless the current international crisis has raised two related arguments that have been repeatedly sustained in the international oppositión to the American positión over Iraq.

Firstly, the incoming war is a war about oil; if Iraq had no oil Washington would not manifest such alacrity to challenge Saddam's control of the country and that the driving force behind Washington's military preparations is the control of the vast Iraqi oil reserves. Yet neither the US nor the rest of the world can ignore the realities of the world stage and one of these hinges around oil. That Iraq possesses vast reserves of oil undoubtedly adds urgency to the US argument given that the world economy has yet to overcome its heavy dependence ón oil. At present, however, their importance is secondary to that of other leading producers in the región and elsewhere. Yet, for the US, a regime in Baghdad controlling vast energy reserves and in possessión of dangerous weapons could eventually add instability and emerge as a problem for the world economy and for international politics, given its influence ón the global politics of oil.

Nevertheless, while oil is of strategic important to the US, it is not the main driving force of the current campaign as its supplies and energy needs are already met by other suppliers and ,in the US energy vision, areas from the former Soviet Republics are gaining increasing prominence with a long-term investment strategy there by leading US oil companies.

Secondly, George W. Bush' s insistence ón "regime change" in Iraq represents a most dangerous - and undemocratic - approach to foreign policy, since any regime that is not likely to conform to Washington's visión is liable to be ón the receiving end of a swift and highly destructive military lesson. This outlook cannot be countenanced under international law and for the smooth running of international politics.

Moreover there are in effect many other areas of the globe, from the Middle East, to Central Africa and South Asia where neither democracy, civil liberties or the rule of law prevail and that are a source of instability for their populations or neighbouring area. Nevertheless the US has for many years failed to acknowledge these realities, nor acted to decisively to condemn them or worse continues to support the prevailing status quo. Furthermore, many of the countries identified as having similar characteristics to those that have generated the crisis over Iraq for the US Administratión - the possessión of weapons of mass destruction, the ignorance of repeated UN Security Council resolutions or even the absence of democratic values - are not perceived to represent a direct threat to the US and its immediate interests.

Yet Washingtón in the new international environment is not in the business of nation-building. The bottom line for the US nowadays, more than at time in the past, is one of national self-interest. The rationale that underlies the current Bush Doctrine and the very reasón for its highly controversial character in the context of international politics, for most of its allies and above all for worldwide public opinion, is that it upholds the belief that an absence of conclusive evidence in relatión to potentially serious international threats - a so-called "smoking gun" - does not conclusively negate an evidence of absence, or that secretly some sinister or dangerous activities may be afoot and it might be too long before proof is obtained and too late for action to be then taken. It is a strategy that envisages a preventive war as instrument of state policy, contrary to established international legal norms. Thus according to the new US doctrine, acting decisively, including with pre-emptive actión may be justified and warranted to prevent a dangerous situatión in the not-too-distant future, especially when the intelligence picture gathered increasingly points to that evidence, since failing to act might result in an atrocity with several thousands of casualties and the disruptions of national societies.

Nevertheless, the US positión over Iraq contrasts particularly sharply with Europe's visión of events, despite the close links and interactions that often prevail in the transatlantic dialogue and the recognised need for unity between the Atlantic partners in times of crises. The international community and including several of the US partners have found highly dubious the link made in the White House between Saddam and al-Qaeda, given the lack of objective proof underlying this outlook and have rather read some narrower and more political reasons in the Administration's motives. The military optión has therefore raised a high degree of criticism and has been perceived as far from inevitable.

Washington has failed to convince Europeans, especially the vast majority of public opinions and, with a few exceptions most EU governments, of the correctness of its case over the fight against international terrorism. Iraq in fact has generated one of the most serious rifts in US-European relations for decades, unparalleled since the height of the Cold War - when Washington also sought to convince its allies that they could not escape taking the path of military firmness - with the Bush Administratión notably shocked at the lack of public European support for its stance and by the virulence of the incoming international criticism. This has led Washingtón to express less than flattering comments ón the political relevance or importance of some of its traditional allies and partners.

However part of the cause for the strain in US-European relations and the ongoing tensión lies in the continued absence of European unity over international affairs. The current disagreement has its roots in a diverging perception of threats ón the international stage. Nowadays the US perceptión is in marked contrast with that of many European nations whose viewpoint is still to recognize and accept a presumptión of innocence unless events prove otherwise. Yet the fact that they are not unanimous in this belief leads President Bush to see Europe as a feeble and unreliable ally, that is not of great help in the present situatión and consequently forces Bush to act as the "lone rider" in the face of the upcoming danger.

Furthermore, there is yet no unity or shared political resolve in the European Union over the current crisis. Europe is neither unanimous nor really supportive of the US belief in the need to target and destroy the sources of international terrorism, as it was in the past in resisting against Soviet expansionism. In Washington's view, Europe's lax attitudes in fact have already led to several terrorist infiltrations onto its area and European governments have not shown the same resolve to combat against this manifestation despite the unequivocal and destructive impact of September 11. Had Europe shown itself more united in its willingness to address the issue of international terrorism - given the ease with which terror cells had also set themselves up in the midst of European societies even before September 11 - and with the same forceful determinatión that the US has displayed, Washingtón might not have opted for the military optión to the exclusión of all others.

However the terrorist threat in a political perspective, represents a different consideratión for many European governments and societies and does not raise a military consideration, since it is a dimensión that at a national level, and with international ramifications (from the IRA to ETA and from the Red Brigades to Corsican Nationalists and to the Baader-Meinhof cells), has been for many years far more a part of the fabric of domestic societies than it has ever been for the US.

Moreover, the current US determinatión over Iraq is not as groundbreaking as it may at first appear and possesses a clear regional antecedent with equivalent motives. It was also the rationale underlying past Israeli reactión towards Iraq, with a decisión by Jerusalem to launch a preventive military raid over the Osiraq nuclear facility in 1981 to prevent the reactor becoming operational a few months later, as it could have subsequently led to a destabilising and dangerous new development across the region.

The divergent appraisal of the terrorist issue, therefore, also forms part of the determinatión of the US Administratión of George W. Bush to "go-it-alone", with or without UN or his traditional allies, and despite the sustained level of international oppositión to the contemporary character and pronouncements of US foreign and security policy and its growing readiness to rely ón its unrivalled military superiority.